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TWO EARLY BUDDHIST REFUTATIONS OF THE EXISTENCE OF IŚVARA AS THE CREATOR OF THE UNIVERSE

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We know from the ancient Indian literature, inscriptions and the account of foreign travellers to India [1] that, even before the doctrine of a Supreme Being was discussed and defended by the theistic systems — of which the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika stood out as the foremost champion of Indian philosophical theism —, a belief in and worship of a supreme personal Being under the different names of Brahmā [2], Viṣṇu or Śiva was prevalent in India from very ancient times, however anthropomorphic or steeped in mythology this belief was. We also know, on the other hand, that the Buddhists looked upon the gods merely as beings of a superior order with a life longer than that of ordinary mortals and enjoying great happiness [3]. From the very beginning of its existence Buddhism was strongly opposed to the idea of an eternal, omnipotent and omniscient Maker and Lord of the universe such as the Brahmā or the Īśvara of the Hindu theists, and ridiculed or even brought forward arguments against the existence of such a Supreme Being [4]. In this

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[1] Cf. J. Gonda: Die Religionen Indiens, I, Veda und älterer Hinduismus. Stuttgart 1960, pp. 236ff.; E. Lamotte: Histoire du Bouddhisme Indien. Des Origines à l'Ère Śaka. Louvain 1958, pp. 431ff.; K. A. Nilakanta Sastri: Development of Religions in South India, Madras 1963, passim, especially pp. 32 and 56—59; P. R. Srinivasan: Inscriptional Evidence on early Hindu Temples. Brahmavidyā. The Adyar Library Bulletin, Jubilee Volume, Vol. XXV, 1961, pp. 511—523.

[2] On the basis of an analysis of the Purāṇas, P. Hacker has shown that the acceptance of Viṣṇu or Śiva as the Supreme God was preceded by a belief in Brahmā as the Supreme God. Cf. P. Hacker: The Sāṅkhyization of the Emanation Doctrine shown in a critical Analysis of Texts. WZKSO, Vol. V, 1961, pp. 110—112; Cf. also the same author's: Purāṇen and Geschichte des Hinduismus. OLZ, Vol. 55, 1960, cols. 347ff., as well as his remarks in ZDMG, Vol. 112, 1962, p. 209 and ZDMG, Vol. 113, 1963, p. 395.

[3] Cf. H. von Glasenapp: Buddhismus und Gottesidee. Die buddhistischen Lehren von den überweltlichen Wesen und Mächten und ihre religionsgeschichtlichen Parallelen. Wiesbaden 1954, pp. 20 and 30. (There is also a new edition of this work with additional passages of translation of the Buddhist texts mentioned by von Glasenapp, edited by H. Bechert under the title: Der Buddhismus — eine atheistische Religion. Mit einer Auswahl buddhistischer Texte, zusammengestellt von Heinz Bechert, München 1966).

[4] Cf. E. Lamotte: Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, p. 435, where, for instance, a passage from Upadeśa, ascribed to Nāgārjuna, is quoted in translation.

It might be useful to mention here the earlier Buddhist references and refutations of the Īśvara doctrine: Majjhimānikāya (Pali Text Society edition) II, 227; Aṅguttaranikāya, (Pali Text Society edition) I, p. 174; Aśvaghoṣa's Buddhacaritam,

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paper I intend to deal with two such little-known refutations of the existence of Īśvara found in the early Buddhist literature, both of which are directed against the conception of Īśvara as the creator [5] of the universe.

I would like to observe at the very outset that the importance of these two passages lies not so much in their richness of contents for the study of the doctrine of Īśvara as in their quality as milestones in the process of development of the Īśvara doctrine and as early specimens of the Buddhist refutation of the Īśvara doctrine. For just as the development of most of the other philosophical doctrines of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikam is to a large extent, though indirectly, indebted to the incessant and bitter controversies of the opponents, so also the development of the Īśvara doctrine of the Hindu theistic systems owes very much to the controversy of the opponents, who, in this case, were preeminently the Buddhists [6].

1. Yogācārabhūmi

The first passage we are going to consider is found in the Yogācārabhūmi [7], one of the most important texts of the early Yogācāra school of Buddhism. Tradition ascribes this monumental work to Maitreyanātha and Asaṅga [8], but as E. FRAUWALLNER has suggested [9], — the bulkiness of the work seems

Canto IX, verse 63; Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa. Cf. L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, traduit et annoté par LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Paris 1923—1931, Ch. II, p. 311—313; Ch. V, pp. 19 and 58; Hiuan-Tsang's Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. Cf. La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang, traduite et annotée par LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Tome 1er, Paris 1928, p. 30. On the same page is also given a list of Buddhist sources on Īśvara.

[5] Let it be noted that whenever in this paper the term "creator" is used, it is not meant in the Western Christian sense of a Maker who causes the origination of beings *ex nihilo sui et subjecti*, but only in the Indian sense of the term, according to which the *subjectum* is presupposed.

[6] This is more clearly seen in the later development of the Īśvara doctrine, say, after the controversy on the Īśvara doctrine by the great Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti (c. 600—660 A. D.) in his Pramāṇavārttikam II. Cf. the edition of RAHULA SANKRTYAYANA: Pramāṇavārttikam; Appendix to J. B. O. R. S. Vol. XXIV, verses 10—28.

[7] The text used is: The Yogācārabhūmi of Ācārya Asaṅga. Edited by VIDHUSHEKHARA BHATTACHARYA. Part I. University of Calcutta 1957. (Abbreviated: Ybh.). The passage under consideration is found on pp. 144—145.
It might be noted here in passing that there are more Yogācārabhūmi-s than one. Thus Saṅgharakṣa, who is said to have lived in the second century A. D., and thus earlier than Asaṅga, is the author of a Yogācārbhūmiḥ: Cf. PAUL DEMIÉVILLE: La Yogācārabhūmi de Saṅgharakṣa, BEFEO, 44, Hanoi 1954, pp. 395—397; E. LAMOTTE: Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, p. 772. LAMOTTE mentions on the same page also another Yogācārabhūmi, which is ascribed to Buddhasena, who appears to have taught in Kaśmir towards the end of the fifth century A. D. The work is also known by the name of Yogācārabhūmiśāstram.

[8] Cf. THOMAS WATTERS: On Yuan Chwang's Travels in India. Edited by T. W. RHYS DAVIDS and S. W. BUSHELL, Reprinted Delhi 1961. Vol. I, pp. 356—357; Vol. II, pp. 209—210; ANDRÉ BAREAU: Der indische Buddhismus. In: Die Religionen Indiens, Vol. III Stuttgart 1964, p. 139.

[9] ERICH FRAUWALLNER: Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin 1958, p. 265.

to confirm this suggestion —, it was probably the work of a school extending over some generations. We might ascribe this work to the period between ca. 300 and 400 A. D. [10].

This passage occurs in the work in a context where incorrect judgements (*ayoniśomanaskāraḥ*) [11] are dealt with. Sixteen such incorrect judgements are enumerated [12], each of which is afterwards dealt with and refuted. The entire passage dealing with the refutation of the false view of the existence of the Īśvara as creator of the universe consists of a short Pūrvapakṣa followed by a longer Uttarapakṣa.

The Pūrvapakṣin or the upholder of the Īśvara doctrine brings forward two proofs for the existence of Īśvara, one from the sacred scripture (*āgamaḥ*) and the other from reason (*yuktiḥ*). While the author of the Yogācārabhūmi brushes aside the first proof with an indifferent reference to a previous passage, he enunciates the proof from reason in full. This proof, based on a general observation of human events in ordinary life, may be thus formulated: It is for us a matter of common experience that human beings on earth striving after a desired end, namely happiness, gain as the fruit of their endeavours often nothing but unhappiness. This can be ascribed only to the interference of a being other than men. That Being who is responsible for such a course of events is the maker of the universe.

It is to be observed here that the Īśvara whose existence is established by this argument is rather the "director" (*adhiṣṭhātā*) of the course of events in the existence of man rather than the maker of the universe. But it is to be assumed that the theist meant to extend the "directing activity" of Īśvara also to the creation of the universe. That such was his intention is clear from the fact that he applies to Īśvara such expressions as *kartā*, *sraṣṭā* and *nirmātā*, all of which denote his creative activity. Besides being the creator and "director" of the universe, this Īśvara is, we are told, also a father towards his creatures [13].

Having thus exposed the position of his theistic opponent, the author of the Yogācārabhūmi then proceeds to refute this doctrine of Īśvara as maker of the universe. As is customary in several other sections of the work [14], the author introduces his refutation with a verse, which epitomises the arguments

[10] While P. DEMIÉVILLE was unwilling to accept the historicity of Maitreyanātha, E. FRAUWALLNER considers him as a historic person (Cf. op. cit. pp. 6—7) and places him around 300 A. D. (Ibid. p. 296), while he assigns Asaṅga to about 315—390 A. D. (Ibid. p. 326).

[11] L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN translates it as "jugement inexact", "jugement vicieux", "jugement incorrect". Cf. L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, Ch. II, p. 162; Ch. III, p. 70—71; Ch. IV, p. 198.

[12] Cf. Ybh. p. 118.

[13] *pitṛbhūto bhāvānām.* Ibid. p. 144, 15—16.

[14] Cf. for instance, Ybh. pp. 1; 71; 73; 112; 114; 118 etc. passim.

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he is going to bring forward. His arguments against the doctrine of Iśvara as the creator of the universe can be summarised [15] as follows:

1. The Iśvara cannot be the maker of the universe since he does not possess the capacity (*sāmarthyam*) to do so.

2. He would be the creator of the universe, either remaining immanent or being non-immanent in the universe. But both these hypotheses would imply a contradiction.

3. It is a general principle that no one acts without an end in view [16]. But the Iśvara cannot be said to create the universe either for an end in view or without an end in view, since both cases would imply a contradiction.

4. The Iśvara would be the creator of the universe either by his causality alone, or by employing other causes as co-operating causes. But neither of these assumptions can be maintained, since there would be a contradiction in both the cases.

Having thus argued that the doctrine of the creation of the universe implies a number of contradictions, the author rejects this theory as incorrect.

After this brief analysis of the passage, let us come back to the first part where the theistic view is explained. A comparison of the proof for the existence of Iśvara brought forward by the theist here with another passage in the Nyāyabhāṣyam where the Iśvara doctrine is dealt with (Cf. Nyāyasūtras IV, 1, 19—21) yields quite interesting results. In Nyāyasūtram IV, 1, 19 we have the statement of a view: "Iśvara is the cause (of the body etc.) because we see that the actions of men do not (always) attain the (desired) fruit" [17]. Vātsyāyana in his commentary explains this Sūtram as follows: "This person, who strives after (some desired end) does not necessarily attain the fruit of his endeavours. Hence it is inferred that the attainment of the fruit of the actions of the person is dependent upon another. He, on whom it is dependent, he is the Iśvara. Hence the Iśvara is the cause" [18].

One cannot overlook the strikingly close similarity of idea in these two passages, which are taken from two texts, probably not very far removed in time one from the other. This similarity is all the more striking on account of another passage of the Yogācārabhūmiḥ where the creator of the universe is also said to be "a father towards his creatures" [19]; for Vātsyāyana in his excursus on the Iśvara in Nyāyabhāṣyam to Nyāyasūtram IV, 1, 19—21

[15] As the translation of the passages is given below, a detailed exposition of the arguments does not seem necessary.

[16] Cf. Mīmāṃsāślokavārttikam of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Sambandhākṣepavādaḥ, verse 55: *prayojanam anuddiśya na mando'pi pravarttate.*

[17] NS IV, 1, 19: *iśvaraḥ kāraṇam puruṣakarmāphalyadarśanāt.*

[18] Nyāyabhāṣyam to NS IV, 1, 19: *puruṣo 'yaṃ samīhamāno nāvaśyaṃ samīhāphalaṃ prāpnoti; tenānumīyate parādhīnaṃ puruṣasya karmaphalārādhanam iti. yadadhīnaṃ sa iśvaraḥ. tasmād iśvaraḥ kāraṇam iti.*

[19] Ybh. p. 144, 15—16 cited in note 13.

makes the same remark concerning the attitude of the Iśvara with regard to his creatures: "He (i. e. the Iśvara) has attained (all) his desires. Just as a father is to his children, so is the Iśvara a father to his creatures" [20].

Such a close similarity of ideas and even of expressions, it seems to me, cannot be explained by mere coincidenec. If we take into account the date of the Yogācārabhūmiḥ, which, as we said earlier, may be placed between 300 and 400 A. D. and that of the Nyāyabhāṣyam whose author is probably to be placed in the first half of the fifth century A. D. [21], then Vātsyāyana cannot be considered to be the source of these views. The close parallelism of the two passages rather inclines one to assume that Vātsyāyana had made use of a source where these ideas were found, which is probably identical with the source referred to by the author of the Yogācārabhūmiḥ. It is, however, difficult to say whether this common source was some work of the Bhāgavata or other theistic school or whether it was a commentary on the Nyāyasūtras anterior to that of Vātsyāyana [22].

2. *Viṣṇorekakartṛtvanirākaraṇa*

The second passage to be considered is a small independent treatise entitled Viṣṇoreḳakartṛtvaṇirākaraṇam [23]. The text of this small tract found in Mdo Vol. cxxxiii, foll. 330—332 was published by F. W. THOMAS both in its Tibetan and Sanskrit versions in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1903, pp. 345—349 [24]. The editor observes there that

[20] Nyāyabhāṣyam to IV, 1, 21: *āptakalpaś cāyaṃ: yathā pitā apatyānāṃ, tathā pitṛbhūta iśvaro bhūtānām.*

[21] Cf. E. FRAUWALLNER: Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Vol. II, Salzburg 1956, p. 22; E. STEINKELLNER: Die Literatur des älteren Nyāya. WZKSO, Vol. V, 1961, p. 151.

[22] The existence of commentaries to the Nyāyasūtram even anterior to that of Vātsyāyana was suggested by H. UI in his: The Vaiśeshika Philosophy according to the Daśapadārtha-śāstra. Edited by F. W. THOMAS. Reprinted Varanasi 1962, pp. 16 and 86. Lately, G. OBERHAMMER has, on the basis of an analysis of the Nyāyabhāṣyam on Nyāyasūtram I, 1, 5 come to the conclusion that there must have been at least two Nyāya commentaries anterior to Vātsyāyana. Cf. GERHARD OBERHAMMER: Ein Beitrag zu den Vāda-Traditionen Indiens. WZKSO, Vol. VII, 1963, pp. 97—102.

[23] As far as I see, the correct title of the treatise is *Viṣṇorekakartṛtvanirākaraṇam*, although the authors who have referred to this work, such as LOUIS DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN (Cf. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang, Vol. I, p. 30) as well as HELMUTH VON GLASENAPP (Cf. his: Buddhismus und Gottesidee, p. 29) refer to it under the title of *Iśvarakartṛtvanirākṛtiḥ*.

[24] The text was published, according the account of H. JACOBI (Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern, p. 39) and of H. VON GLASENAPP (Buddhismus und Gottesidee, p. 29, footnote) also in „Zapiski", 1906, p. 58. However I could not consult this edition as it was not available to me. A few corrections of readings have been suggested by L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1903, p. 703. I myself have proposed some corrections of the text, which will be mentioned in the notes of the Translation of the work.

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the fact that it appears in one of the last volumes of the Mdo and that it is given in both Sanskrit and the native versions seems to indicate that the work was a comparatively late accession to the Tibetan collection.

Concerning the author of this tract the following observations may be made. In the colophon of this work the revered Ācārya Nāgārjuna (*ācārya-śrīnāgārjunapādāḥ*) is said to be its author. But as A. BAREAU, E. CONZE and E. FRAUWALLNER, among others, have pointed out, there is more than one Nāgārjuna [25], so that we cannot, without due deliberation, ascribe this work to the famous Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika school and the recognised author of such works as the Mādhyamikakārikā, the Vigrahavyāvartanī and the Ratnāvalī [26]. In addition to the fact that there were more Nāgārjuna-s than one, there is also another reason which should keep us on our guard against all too quick an identification of the author of this tract with the illustrious Nāgārjuna on the basis of the identity of names, namely the not uncommon tendency among the early thinkers of India, who were more interested in the spread of the true doctrine than in winning a name for themselves, to father their works upon some teacher of great renown and authority, with a view to give their own works greater authority in the eyes of others [27].

Having thus mentioned the general difficulty entailed in determining the author of the tract under consideration, I would like to express my personal opinion on this matter which, even for me, has no greater value than as a tentative, yet very probable, hypothesis.

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[25] Cf. A. BAREAU: Der indische Buddhismus, In: Die Religionen Indiens, Vol. III, p. 713; E. CONZE: Buddhism: Its Essence and Development, Oxford, third edition 1957, p. 178. E. FRAUWALLNER: Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, pp. 170—171. H. HOFFMANN distinguishes between Nāgārjuna the Philosopher, who lived proably in the second century A. D. and Nāgārjuna the Tantrist and Sorcerer. Cf. his: Die Religionen Tibets. Bon und Lamaismus in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung, Freiburg/München 1956, p. 20.

[26] These three works are, according to the general consent, the works of the illustrious Nāgārjuna. Many other works are also ascribed to him. Cf. A. BAREAU: op. cit., pp. 136—137. E. LAMOTTE is of the view that the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśaḥ is a work of the famous Nāgārjuna (Cf. his: Sur la formation du Mahāyāna. Asiatica. Festschrift Friedrich Weller, Leipzig 1954, pp. 377—396. Further, LAMOTTE refers to this Upadeśaḥ in several places of his: Histoire du Bouddhisme indien, and translates a rather long passage from it concerning Nāgārjuna's view on the Hindu gods, Cf. p. 435 of the same book). But E. FRAUWALLNER does not subscribe to this view (cf. his: Philosophie des Buddhismus, p. 6). Another work ascribed to the famous Nāgārjuna, the Suhṛllekhaḥ, is mostly held to be probably a genuine work of his (cf. A. BAREAU: op. cit., p. 122; E. FRAUWALLNER: Philosophie des Buddhismus, p. 204; E. LAMOTTE: op. cit., p. 379; G. TUCCI: Storia della filosofia indiana, Bari 1957, p. 80). It is interesting to note that in this "Letter to a Friend" there is a passage where it is said that the whole (meant is here the universe too) does not originate from the Īśvara. (Cf. HEINRICH WENZEL: Suhṛllekha. Brief des Nāgārjuna an Kōnig Udayana. Übersetzung aus dem Tibetischen. Leipzig 1886, p. 15, verse 50).

[27] Such is also the case, for example, with many of the works ascribed to the great Vedāntin Śaṅkarācārya.

In the first place, it is significant that A. BAREAU, E. CONZE, E. FRAUWALLNER, E. LAMOTTE, G. TUCCI who have dealt with the philosophical aspect of Buddhism, have all dealt with Nāgārjuna in their works, but none of them, as far as I know, has enumerated this tract among the works of the famous Nāgārjuna, the author of the Mādhyamikakārikā. To my knowledge, it is only H. VON GLASENAPP, H. JACOBI, F. Th. STCHERBATSKY and L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN who have made reference to this small treatise [28]. JACOBI seems to doubt that this work comes from the pen of the author of the Mādhyamikakārikā's, although he is inclined to believe that the work is rather old [29]. The dialectical method of argumentation which this tract possesses in common with the works of the famous Nāgārjuna cannot, by itself alone, be a sufficient argument for the ascription of this work to the great Nāgārjuna, since this method of argumentation seems to have been much in vogue in the early Mādhyamika school of Buddhism.

There is, however, at least one reason that inclines me to decline the ascription of this tract to the great Nāgārjuna, which is derived from the text itself. In the opening verse the author of the Viṣṇorekakartṛtvanirākaraṇam makes his obeisance to his preceptor and to Vajrasattva [30]. As far as it is known to me, the cult of Vajrasattva is a development in the Tantric Buddhism after the period of the great Nāgārjuna [31]. This fact, it seems to me, speaks against this tract being ascribed to the great Nāgārjuna.

On the other hand, whether this text should, then, be ascribed to the Nāgārjuna who, in the view of A. BAREAU and E. CONZE lived in the seventh century A. D. [32], is a question which cannot be definitely answered for the moment. It is probable that this tract comes from the pen of this Nāgārjuna. Significant, however, is the fact that the author of the Viṣṇorekakartṛtvanirākaraṇam does not seem to have undergone any influence of the logical development commenced by the great Dignāga and perfected especially by Dharma-

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[28] Cf. H. VON GLASENAPP: Buddhismus und Gottesidee, p. 29; H. JACOBI: Die Entwicklung der Gottesidee bei den Indern, p. 39. In this same passage JACOBI quotes from a letter written to him by St. STCHERBATSKY. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN: Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang, Tome I, p. 30.

[29] Thus H. JACOBI writes: „Ob er (i. e. dieser kleine, aber sehr klare Aufsatz) wirklich von Nāgārjuna herrührt, mag zweifelhaft sein, aber sicher ist er ziemlich alt" (op. cit., p. 39).

[30] The Vajrasattva of the Buddhist Tantrism is endowed with the attributes that are usually ascribed to the Īśvara of the Brahmanical systems and is identified with the Primeval Buddha, a kind of omnipotent and omniscient Being, who originates the universe through his meditation. Cf. H. VON GLASENAPP: Buddhismus und Gottesidee, pp. 84 and 115; A. BAREAU: op. cit., pp. 183—184; D. SNELLGROVE: Buddhist Himalaya. Travels and Studies in quest of the origins and nature of Tibetan Religion. Oxford 1957, pp. 74 and 244.

[31] It is to be observed that there are legendary accounts which make the illustrious Nāgārjuna a teacher of Tantric doctrines. But as A. BAREAU points out, probably these legends are to be connected with another author with the same name. Cf. A. BAREAU: op. cit., p. 173; Cf. also E. CONZE: Buddhism, p. 179.

[32] A. BAREAU places him in the seventh century (op. cit., p. 173), while E. CONZE (op. cit., p. 178) proposes a more precise date, namely, ca. 600—650 A. D.

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kīrti [33], and that his arguments against the existence of the Īśvara have not much in common with the more systematic arguments of Dharmakīrti.

Whoever might have been the author of this tract, its importance for the historian of the doctrine of the Indian philosophical theism lies in the fact that it is probably one of the earlier independent treatises refuting the Īśvara doctrine.

After these preliminary observations concerning the author of this tract, let us pass on to a brief analysis of its contents.

As is customary with the early Indian works, this tract too opens with a verse of salutation to the author's preceptor [34] and to his favourite deity, in the present case, the Vajrasattva. The introductory verse also enunciates the motive that urged him to compose this treatise: "Moved by compassion I write (this treatise) for the instruction of the good disciples" [35]. Thus it was intended to instruct his disciples in the right doctrine and to guard them against the false conceptions regarding the origin of the universe, concerning which several theories were being proposed and propounded. For the Buddhists, the universe does not owe its origination to a supreme personal Being; it is the Karma itself that regulates and determines all the events in the universe [36].

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[33] According to E. FRAUWALLNER, the date of Dignāga is ca. 480—540, while that of Dharmakīrti is ca. 600—660 A. D. (cf. his: Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic. WZKSO, Vol. V, 1961, pp. 135—138).

It might be observed here that one might make this an argument for ascribing this work to an author who lived before them, and consequently to the famous Nāgārjuna himself. In fact, my principal difficulty in ascribing this work to the famous author of the Mādhymikakārikā-s rests on its author's salutation of Vajrasattva. If it can be shown that the famous Nāgārjuna was really the author of Buddhist Tantric texts or that he followed or originated the Tantric Buddhism, I am willing to revise my opinion as regards the author of the Viṣṇorekakartṛtvanirākaraṇam. The contents of this treatise seem, indeed, to indicate that its author was unaware of the philosophical developments, even in the Buddhist refutation of the Īśvara doctrine, that took place between the fifth and the seventh centuries A. D. Cf. for instance, Vasubandhu's refutation in Abhidharmakośa (L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN's translation) Ch. II, pp. 311—313; Ch. V, p. 19 and Dharmakīrti's refutation in the Pramāṇavārttikam II, verses 10—28.

[34] Unfortunately, the preceptor's name is not mentioned. Otherwise it might have afforded us a clue to the identification of the author of this tract.

[35] *suśiṣyapratibodhārthaṃ kṛpayā likhyate mayā.*

[36] *sabbam idaṃ kammato.* Suttanipāta, p. 654; Vasubandhu in the fourth chapter of his Abhidharmakośa says: (I use the French translation of L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN): „Par qui est faite (*kṛta*) la variété du monde des êtres vivants (*sattvaloka*) et du monde-réceptacle (*bhājanaloka*) qui ont été décrits dans le chapitre précédent? Ce n'est pas Dieu (*iśvara*) qui la fait intelligemment (*buddhipūrvaka*). La variété du monde naît de l'acte (*karmajam lokavaicitryam*). La variété du monde naît des actes des êtres vivants" (Op. cit., Ch. IV, p. 1).

Note also the following verse from Abhidharmadīpaḥ (Abhidharmadīpa with Vibhāshāprabhāvṛtti, edited by P. S. JAINI. Patna 1959. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Vol. IV) p. 155:

kāyikaṃ vāṅmayaṃ caiva cetanākhyaṃ ca mānasam |
karmāṇy etāni lokasya kāraṇaṃ, neśvarādayaḥ ||

Cf. also Jñānaśrīmitra's remark: *tad evam iśvarāsiddhch sakalajanminām śubhāśubhakarmāṇi nopakaraṇam, kiṃ tu kāraṇāny eva lokavaicitryasya.* (Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvaliḥ, edited by A. THAKUR, p. 262).

A doctrine that taught the Īśvara to be the creator of the universe was, for the Buddhist, a heretical doctrine, and the worthy followers of the Buddha were to be put on their guard against such a false doctrine.

The Pūrvapakṣa that follows does not give us much information regarding the Īśvara doctrine of the theist. Although we would have expected a brief exposition of the argument of the theist for the existence of the Īśvara, as was the case with the passage in the Yogācārabhūmi, which we have considered, the author of this tract disposes of the Pūrvapakṣa in just one-and-a-half lines in print, while the rest of the work is entirely devoted to the refutation of the Īśvara as the creator of the universe. All that we can deduce from the Pūrvapakṣa about the Īśvara is that he is the creator (*kartā*) of the universe. But we are not told, for example, anything about his attributes, such as whether he is omnipotent or omniscient, nor are we told anything about his nature or about the motive of his creative activity. Thus with regard to the Īśvara doctrine itself this tract offers us much less material than the passage from the Yogācārabhūmi.

The main purpose of this tract is to refute the existence of the Īśvara as the creator of the universe. The arguments brought forward for this purpose can be thus summarised:

1. He who is a maker of something makes either that which is already existent (*siddha-*), or that which is non-existent (*asiddha-*) or that which is both existent and non-existent (*siddhāsiddha-*). But the Īśvara cannot be said to be a creator in any of these ways.

2. The Īśvara makes the other beings either he himself having an origination or without he himself having an origination. But neither of these assumptions is possible.

The general impression that one receives from the text as a whole is that, from the point of view of the Īśvara doctrine itself as well as from the point of view of the arguments against the Īśvara being the creator of the universe and the examples brought forward to substantiate the arguments, the author of this tract was no great thinker [37]. Rather, one feels inclined to think that the alternatives in his arguments are made more for an eristic purpose than for convincing his opponent, although it should be pointed out that this sort of argumentation, common in the Mādhyamika school of Buddhism has a deeper meaning, and probably a mystical significance, than might appear to an ordinary reader.

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[37] It should, however, be added that this remark is relative and that it holds good only if the author of this tract lived about the seventh century A. D. In case the author lived in the first centuries of the Christian era, say, before the composition of the Yogācārabhūmi, then, in the light of the philosophical method and development of that period, the author might be said to have been an author of importance.

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Further, it is to be noted that neither in the Pūrvapakṣa nor in the Uttarapakṣa is mention made of the appellation of this Īśvara, while in the title as well as in the colophon at the end we are told that this Īśvara is Viṣṇu. In the same manner, both the title as well as the colophon at the end mention that Viṣṇu is the sole creator. Although there is no explicit mention of it in the body of the text, the whole tenor of the argumentation clearly shows that the creator meant in the text is the sole creator of the universe.

Translation

1. *Yogācārabhūmi*

"Which is the doctrine that (teaches that) Īśvara etc. [38] are the maker (of the universe)? As for instance, when someone here, whether he be a monk or a Brahmin, ... in detail as before [39]. All that this human individual (*puruṣapudgalaḥ*) [40] experiences is caused either by the activity of Īśvara or it is caused by the activity of another person and so on. Such (is the doctrine of) those who hold objects such as Īśvara etc. to be the cause (of the universe).

For what reason is such a view maintained by the follower of such a doctrine?

Because of sacred scriptures (*āgamaḥ*) and because of reasoning (*yuktiḥ*).

The sacred scripture is as before [41].

Which is the reasoning?

As for instance, when someone here becomes a philosopher ... etc. as before [42]. For we see (people) engaging themselves with regard to cause and fruit in accordance with their own wishes. Thus while the living beings, at

[38] The *ādi* here refers probably to the other causes of the universe, postulated by the different schools. Some such causes — *kālaḥ, svabhāvaḥ, niyatiḥ, yadṛcchā* etc. — have been mentioned by the Śvet. Upaniṣad I, 2 and VI, 1. Cf. also Mahābhārata 12. 267 and Atharva-Veda XIX, 53, 5—6 (where *kālaḥ* is said to be the cause) and Aśvaghoṣa's Buddhacarita IX, verses 58—61 (where *svabhāvaḥ* is said to be the cause). In Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara we have a passage where different views are mentioned concerning the efficient cause of the universe: (*pṛthivyādināṃ*) *nimittakāraṇe vipratipadyante, kecit kālaṃ, kecid īśvaram, kecit prakṛtim iti.* (Bibliotheca Indica edition, edited by VINDHYESVARI PRASADA DUBE, Calcutta 1907, p. 461, 2—3).

In the Śālistamba Sūtra (edited by N. AIYASWAMI SASTRI, Adyar Library 1950), p. 6 there is a passage referring to the different causes of the universe as proposed by different schools: *sa cāṅkuro na svayaṃkṛto na parakṛto neśvarakṛto na kālapariṇāmito na prakṛtisaṃbhūto na caikakāraṇādhino nāpy ahetusamutpannaḥ.*

[39] Similar references are found in several parts of the text. v. g. pp. 118, 14ff.; 120, 13—14; 122, 13—14. etc.

[40] "Individual" (Skt. *pudgala-*; Pāli: *puggala-*) in Buddhism is to be understood only in a relative sense. It is used as a mere conventional term for the "stream of *skandha*-s" constituting the individual or person. It does not really express a permanent and substantial soul. The author probably takes this term from the Pudgalavāda.

[41] Cf. p. 119, 5—6 for a similar reference.

[42] Cf. p. 119, 7—9 for a similar reference.

the time of the cause (i. e. at the time of the activity) think, "We shall engage ourselves with regard to what is good (*śubhe*)", engage themselves also in what is sinful (*pāpe*) without their desiring it. And at the time of (reaping the) fruit, while they think, "We shall be born in a good existence (*sugatau*), in the heavenly world, among the gods", they are born in bad existences (*apāyeṣu*) [42a]. Although they think, "We shall experience happiness", they experience only unhappiness. There is someone, who is the maker (*kartā*), who is the creator (*sraṣṭā*), who is the builder (*nirmātā*), who is a father to the beings, an Īśvara or someone other than he, by whom this happens to them.

(Refutation:)

Such a person (who maintains this view) is to be censured as follows: (Here is) the summary:

(Īśvara cannot be the maker of the universe) because he cannot have the capacity (to create the universe); because there would be contradiction in that he would be immanent (in the universe) and not immanent; because there would be fault in his having or not having a purpose (for creation), as well as in his being a cause.

Do you mean that the capacity (of Īśvara) to create has for cause either the performance of work (*karmayogaḥ*) or that it has no cause? [42b] If it has the performance of work as the cause, it is not right (that Īśvara is the cause of the universe) since the universe would have that performance of work as its cause. If, (on the other hand), it has no cause, then, since the universe has no cause, it is not right (to maintain that Īśvara is its cause).

Do you mean that Īśvara is immanent [42c] (in the universe) or that he is not immanent? If he is immanent (in the universe), it is not right to say that he creates the universe, since he would possess the same nature as the

[42a] The terms *sugatiḥ* and *apāyaḥ* have a special significance in Buddhism. Buddhist texts speak of five (some texts speak of six) *gati*-s or modes of existence. They are, according to the Abhidharmakośa of Vasubandhu the infernal beings, animals, Preta-s or spirits, human beings and gods. The *sugatiḥ* meant here in the text is the mode of existence as gods. Apāya is contrasted to *sugatiḥ*. According to the Buddhist texts there are four *apāya*-s or undesirable modes of existence, namely, that of the condemned, the animals, the Preta-s or spirits and the Asura-s. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN translates *sugati* as "bonne destinée" and *apāyaḥ* as "mauvaise destinée". For further informations and references on *sugatiḥ* and *apāyaḥ* cf. L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, translated by L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Ch. III, p. 11ff.; Ch. IV, p. 203. Cf. also Abhidharma-Samuccaya of Asaṅga, edited by P. PRADHAN, Santiniketan 1950, p. 61.

[42b] Perhaps there is another interpretation of this argument, taking *karmayogaḥ* in the sense of "(Īśvara's) conjunction with the Karma (of the beings)".

[42c] The term "immanent" has been chosen only for want of a better one. "Included" (in the univers) might be more literal. The idea behind the argument seems to be clear enough.

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universe. If he is not immanent, then it is not correct to say that he creates the universe, since he would have no relation to it [43].

Do you mean that (Īśvara creates the universe) having a purpose or without having a purpose? If he (creates) in view of a purpose, then it would not be right to say that he is the lord of the universe, since he would not be the lord of that purpose (which he aims to attain by his creation). And if he (creates) without a purpose, then it is not correct to say (on the one hand) that he has no purpose in view and (on the other) that he creates [44].

Do you mean that the creation (*sargaḥ*) is caused by Īśvara (alone) or that it is caused (with the help of) some material cause different from him? If it has Īśvara alone as cause, then, when there is Īśvara, there is creation and when there is creation [44a], there is Īśvara, and thus it will not be correct to say that the creation is caused by Īśvara. If it is caused (with the help of) some material cause different from him, then, is it caused by his will (*icchā*) or is it caused by some other material cause without his will? If it is caused by his will, is that same will caused by Īśvara alone or is it caused (with the help of) some material cause other than him? If it is [44b] caused by Īśvara alone, when there is Īśvara there is his will and when there is his will there is Īśvara and thus there would be creation at all times [45]. If, (on the other hand), it [45a] is caused with the help of some material cause other than him, such (a material cause) is not observed. And it is not right to say that he is the lord of the universe, if he is not the lord of that (material cause) also.

Hence even from the point of view of capacity (of Īśvara to create), even from the point of view of his being immanent (in the universe) or not being immanent, even from the point of view of his having a purpose in view or not having a purpose in view (for his activity), even from the point of view of the nature of the cause, it is not correct (to maintain that Īśvara is the cause of the universe).

Hence this view too [46] is affected by incongruencies."

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[43] Literally, "he being released (free) from it".

[44] The principle that underlines this argument is that no one will ever betake himself to any activity whatsoever, unless he has some purpose (*prayojanam*) in view. Uddyotakara in his Nyāyavārttika (Bibl. Ind. edition) p. 466, 14—15 observes: *loke hi ye kartāro bhavanti, te kiñcid uddiśya pravartante, idam āpsyāmi idaṃ hāsyāmi ca iti.*

[44a] Ybh. p. 145, line 10: Correct the text: *yadā sargas ...* as separate words.

[44b] Ybh. p. 145, line 13 last word: I think it should be *sā* (= *icchā*).

[45] The same argument has been brought forward by the opponents also later on. To mention only a few such passages: Nyāyavārttika, p. 467, 2ff.; Śāntideva's Boddhicaryāvatāra, Pariccheda IX, verse 124; Vyomavatī (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series edition, edited by Gopinath Kaviraj, Benares 1930) p. 305, 15ff.; Nyāyamañjarī (Kashi Sanskrit Series, No. 106, edited by Surya Narayana Sukla, Benares 1936) Part I, p. 185, 7ff.

[45a] Ybh. p. 145, line 15: Instead of *sa* I read *sā*.

[46] This is only one of the sixteen false views. Some of them have been refuted even before the refutation of the Īśvara theory.

2. *Viṣṇorekakartṛtvanirākaraṇam*

"The Refutation of Īśvara as the Creator, named 'The Refutation of Viṣṇu as the Sole Creator'.

Having reverentially saluted the lotus-like feet of my preceptor and the Vajrasattva, and being moved by compassion I write (this tract) for the instruction of the good disciples.

(Some say): Indeed there exists an Īśvara who is the creator. Let him indeed be considered. He who makes something is a creator. He who performs an action is to be designated as a creator.

(Refutation:)

But with regard to this (theory) we answer:

Does he create that which is (already) existent (*siddha-*) or that which is not (already) existent (*asiddha-*)?

Of these, firstly, he does not create that which is (already) existent, because there is no creation of it (since it exists already), just as when the individual (*pudgalaḥ*) is existent, there is no creation of the maker who again effects it, since it is already existent.

And if, (on the other hand), you say that he creates what is not (already) existent [47], (we answer): Oil out of sand is not existent; hairs (on the body) of the tortoise etc. are not existent. Let him (i. e. Īśvara) make this same. But his being a creator with regard to this is not possible. Why? Because it has the character of what is not existent. Such is this (maker).

Or, he creates that which is (both) already existent and (at the same time) that which is not already existent. That too is not correct, since there is mutual contradiction; for that which is existent, that is indeed existent, and that which is not existent, that is not existent at all. Thus there would necessarily be mutual contradiction of these two even as (there is mutual contradiction) between light and darkness and between life and death. For where there is light, there is no darkness, and where there is darkness, there is no light at all. Surely, he who is alive, is indeed alive, (and) he who is dead, he is indeed dead. For this same reason, since with regard to one and the same thing it cannot be that a thing is (at the same time) existent and not existent, our view is that Īśvara cannot at all be a creator [47a].

Furthermore, there would be another objection too. Does he (namely,

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[47] *ceta* in the text (JRAS, p. 346, line 3) is a printer's mistake. It should be *cet*.

[47a] I should, indeed, confess that I have not yet fully understood the idea behind this threefold alternatives of *siddham*, *asiddham* and *siddhāsiddham*. It is quite probable that the author here refers to an argumentation which was well understood and accepted by his hearers or readers and that it has thus more than a pure eristic value.

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the Iśvara) create other beings he himself having had an origination or without he himself having had an origination?

But, first of all, he cannot create other beings without he himself having had an origination. Why? Because he himself possesses a nature that has no origination [48]. Just as the son of a barren woman, who has not had his origination, cannot effect actions such as letting fall a spade etc., so is the case also with Iśvara [49].

On the other hand, if he creates other beings, he himself having had an origination, whence had he his origination? Had he his origination from himself, or from another (being) or from both?

Of these, in the first place, he cannot have his origination from himself, since activity towards oneself (*svātmani kriyā*) [49a] is contradictory; for the blade (even) of a very sharp sword is not able to cut its own self; nor indeed is a young dancer, however well trained he might be, able to climb on his own shoulders and dance. Besides, it is neither observed nor is it acceptable that a person is himself his generator and himself the generated. Such a saying as that a person is himself his own father and himself his own son, is not known in the world [50].

Or, let it be that (Iśvara has his origination from another being) [51]. But even that is not right; for as long as the Iśvara does not exist, another being would not exist. Or let it be that they (originate each other) in succession. But even if he has his origination from another in this manner, there would result an infinite regress [52], since it has a beginningless nature. The refutation of the termination of that being which has no beginning is nothing else than its non-existence. (For example) when the seed is absent, there arises the non-existence (i. e. the absence) of sprout, trunk, branches, leaves, flowers, fruits etc. Why? Because of the absence of seed.

Nor can (Iśvara have his origination) from both (himself and from another being), since that would be vitiated by both the (above-mentioned) defects.

Hence the creator (of the universe) is not established.

Thus ends the refutation of Iśvara as the creator, named 'The Refutation of Viṣṇu as the Sole Creator.'

This work is of the revered preceptor Nāgārjuna."

Concluding Remarks

The importance of these two passages for the student of the history of development of the Indian philosophical theism, as we said before, consists mainly in the fact that they represent the early specimens of the Buddhist refutation of the Iśvara doctrine. The religious sect, which we know to have been the worshippers of Viṣṇu as a Supreme Being in the early centuries of the Christian era are probably the Bhāgavatas [53], and the adherents of the school of Pāñcarātra [54], and hence it is possible that the Viṣṇorekakartṛtvanirākaraṇam might have been directed against the doctrine of this sect [55]. The passage of the Yogācārabhūmiḥ does not mention the name of the Supreme Creator it refutes, and hence it could be applied to any sect of Hinduism which accepted and worshipped a Supreme Being, irrespective of the fact whether this Being was called Brahmā, Viṣṇu or Śiva. The passage from the Yogācārabhūmiḥ, whose date can be fixed with some approximate certainty enables us to note the beginnings of the Buddhist controversies against the doctrine of the Iśvara, a controversy which, in course of time, took more definite forms and larger proportions and gave rise to such lengthy and systematically constructed refutations of the Iśvara doctrine such as the Iśvaraparīkṣā of Śāntarakṣita [56], the Iśvaravādaḥ of Jñānaśrīmitra [57] and the Iśvarasādhanadūṣaṇam of his

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[48] It may be observed here that the same argument is brought forward by Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725—788 A. D. Cf. E. Frauwallner: Landmarks in the history of Indian Logic. WZKSO, Vol. V, 1961, p. 141) in his Tattvasaṃgraha (Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita, with the commentary of Kamalaśīla, edited by E. Krishnamacharya, Baroda 1926: Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. XXX, p. 54): Iśvaraparīkṣā, verse 87:

neśvaro janmināṃ hetur utpattivikalatvataḥ |
gaganāmbhojavat sarvam anyathā yugapad bhavet ||

Kamalaśīla, his disciple (ca. 740—795 A. S. Cf. E. Frauwallner: Landmarks ..., pp. 141–144), thus comments on it: *yad utpattivikalaṃ, na tat kasyacit kāraṇaṃ, yathā gaganāmbhojam, utpattivikalaśceśvara iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ.*

[49] Remove the fullstop before *tathā* on p. 346, line 14 of the text.

[49a] What is meant here by the contradiction in *svātmani kriyā* is that it is contradictory for the subject of an action and the object of that same action to be one and the same.

[50] I read the text p. 346, lines 19—21 as follows: *kiṃ ca svayam eva janyaḥ svayam eva janaka ity evaṃ na dṛṣṭaṃ iṣṭaṃ vā. svayam eva pitā svayam eva putra iti naiṣa vādo lokaprasiddhaḥ.*

[51] Instead of *bhavatu para* on p. 346, line 21, I read *bhavatu parata*. This is the second of the three alternatives proposed in line 16 of the same page.

[52] Instead of *evaṃ ca parato 'pyaanavasthāprasaṅgaḥ* in line 23 of p. 346 and line 1 of p. 347, read: *evaṃ ca parato'pyanavasthāprasaṅgaḥ.*

[53] On the Bhāgavatas and their doctrines Cf. J. N. Farquhar: An Outline of the Religious Literature of India, London 1920, pp. 229ff.; L. Renou: L'Inde Classique, Manuel des Études indiennes, edited by L. Renou and J. Filliozat, Tome I, Paris 1947, Nos. 1305ff.

[54] On the Pāñcarātras and their doctrines Cf. F. O. Schrader: Introduction to the Pāñcarātra and the Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā. Adyar 1916; J. N. Farquhar: Op. cit., pp. 240ff.; L. Renou: Op. cit., Nos. 1316ff.

[55] It may be observed here that in Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita we have an indication to a refutation of Viṣṇu as the creator; for in the concluding verse of the Puruṣaparīkṣā (p. 79, verse 170) the author remarks:

śauryātmajādayo ye'pi dhātāraḥ parikalpitāḥ |
etenaiva prakāreṇa nirastāste'pi vastutaḥ ||

Śauri is here another name for Viṣṇu, as Kamalaśīla explains it in his commentary to the same verse.

[56] Cf. Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla, Iśvaraparīkṣā, pp. 40—58 (verses 46—93).

[57] Cf. Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali (Buddhist Philosophical Works of Jñānaśrīmitra) edited by A. Thakur, Patna 1959, Iśvaravādaḥ, pp. 233—316.

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disciple Ratnakīrti [58], to mention but the most important independent treatises of controversy on the Īśvara doctrine. Although the Īśvara doctrine was not the most important bone of contention between the early Buddhist and the theistic Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools, still it seems to have been one of the main doctrines concerning which there was bitter controversy between the two schools, at least in the later stages of their history. Further a glance at the arguments in the Uttarapakṣa of these two passages shows that, although clad in a less precise and logically less formal garb, some of the arguments against the assumption of the existence of the Īśvara as creator of the universe that were brought forward by the later opponents of the Īśvara doctrine are found in these passages, especially the problem of the motive of the activity of the Īśvara [59] as well as the difficulties arising from the assumption of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika that the Īśvara makes use of other causes such as the *adṛṣṭam* of souls as auxiliary causes in his creative activity [60].

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[58] Cf. Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali (Buddhist Nyāya Works of Ratnakīrti), edited by A. THAKUR. Patna 1957, Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇam, pp. 29—52.

[59] Cf. L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu (translated by L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN) Ch. II, p. 312; Ślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Sambandhākṣepavāda, verses 49ff.; Syādvādamañjarī of Malliṣeṇa, edited by A. B. DHRUVA, Bombay 1933, p. 30; Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Part I, p. 176, 17ff.; and in most of the later refutations of the Īśvara doctrine.

[60] Cf. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang (translation by L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN), Tome I, p. 30; Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāraḥ, (edited by P. L. VAIDYA, Darbhanga 1960) Paricccheda IX, verses 124—125 (pp. 258—260); Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Ślokavārttika, Sambandhākṣepavāda, verse 54; Syādvādamañjarī of Malliṣeṇa, p. 29; Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, Part I, p. 176, 32ff.; etc.

THE MUDGALOPANIṢAD

By Jan Gonda, Utrecht

Introduction

The Mudgalopaniṣad [1] is one of the minor and later upaniṣads. Its first part consists of nine ślokas in which an attempt is made to explain the substance of the Puruṣasūkta (ṚV. 10, 90) — which, so to say, is the foundation stone of Viṣṇuite philosophy —, and to identify the Primeval Person with Viṣṇu. Section two — like three and four written in prose — pretends to be the résumé of esoteric instruction imparted by (Viṣṇu-) Vāsudeva to Indra, the representative of those inhabitants of the universe who are not yet initiated into the secret knowledge of Bhāgavatism and final emancipation. The teachings themselves are in substantial agreement with the main tenets of epic and post-epic, especially pāñcarātric, Viṣṇuism with regard to the relations between the One — who is not only the origin of the world but also the cause of final emancipation — and the evolved universe, with occasional references to the vyūha doctrine, Brahmā's function as a demiurge etc. Section three deals with the various aspects and manifestations of the Highest Being and the effects of identificatory worship. After having enumerated some of the negative qualities of the Highest and explained their character, the last section enlarges upon the good results of the study of this work and the precautions to be taken in teaching it.

Thus this small upaniṣad is one of the documents attesting to the long process of penetration of older ('Vedic') doctrine and traditions by younger, so-called Hinduistic, and in casu Viṣṇuite doctrines, to the endeavour, on the part of Viṣṇuite teachers, to support their own beliefs and theories by Vedic authority, to harmonize them to Vedic lore, and to adapt the latter to the requirements of their own milieu and times. The importance of the Veda is no less emphasized than Viṣṇu's identity with the Original One and Highest, the study of the Vedic corpus is regarded as no less essential than initiation into the esoteric doctrines of his devotees. The author's view of the process of creation and the relation between the One and the world is, as compared with, for instance, definite Pāñcarātra texts, rather uncomplicated: one fourth of

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[1] Edition used: One hundred and eight upanishads, ed. by V. L. Sh. PANŚIKAR, Bombay [4]1932, p. 351—353.

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